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CONCLUSION
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner is an unfortunate decision. The Lloyd
test of "related to" and "adequate alternative forum" conceals more
problems than it resolves. The Lloyd rationale cripples Logan Valley
without attempting to refute its logic. And the Lloyd result, although
perhaps acceptable on the particular facts of the case,56 represents a
rather inflexible approach to the delicate process of accommodating
conflicting rights. Taken together, Logan Valley and Lloyd pose such a
sharp contrast that one is tempted to sympathize with Justice Marshall:
"I am aware," he said, "that the composition of this Court has radically
changed. .... 57
FRANK M. PARKER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Jury Unanimity No Longer Required in State
Criminal Trials
For more than six centuries the common law tradition has required
a unanimous vote of a twelve-man jury to convict an accused in a
criminal proceeding.' The Burger Court, in a pair of sharply divided
opinions, has radically altered that traditional formula. Two years ago,
in Williams v. Florida,2 the Court held that the twelve-man jury panel
is not an indispensable element of the sixth amendment jury trial guar-
antee. A panel of six was found adequate in that case, and the Court
left open the possibility of an even smaller jury in some cases. More
recently, in Apodaca v. Oregon3 and a companion case from Louisiana,
'If, as Justice Powell maintained, respondents could have moved to the sidewalks surrounding
Lloyd Center and reached virtually the same audience as was inside the mall, Lloyd's reversal of
the lower court's decision did not compromise first amendment interests. An inquiry into whether
or not an equally effective forum existed would have been relevant to the balancing of rights
involved. However, the "related to" criterion is immaterial to the balancing process. Furthermore,
its use allows the property owner an unjustified measure of control over the content of the asserted
"speech."
5192 S. Ct. at 2237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (7th ed. 1956); J. THAYER, A PRELIM-
INARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 88-90 (1898).
2399 U.S. 78 (1970).
192 S. Ct. 1628 (1972). The companion case, Johnson v. Louisiana, 92 S. Ct. 1620 (1972),
was originally tried several months before the Court's decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), which held the sixth amendment jury trial right applicable to the states under the due
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the Supreme Court decided that the unanimity requirement was not an
essential element of trial by jury in state criminal proceedings. The
majority, composed of the four Nixon appointees and Justice White
(who announced the decision), upheld convictions by jury votes of ten
to two and nine to three.
The right to trial by jury in criminal cases in the federal courts is
provided by article III, section three and the sixth amendment to the
Constitution. The Court has said that this includes the right to
a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes
all the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and
England when the Constitution was adopted . . . . Those elements
were- (1) that the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more nor
less; (2) that the jury be in the presence or under the superintendence
of a judge . . . and (3) that the verdict should be unanimous.'
The sixth amendment jury trial guarantee was held applicable to
the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
four years ago in Duncan v. Louisiana.5 Justice White, writing for the
Court, held that a defendant had the right to a jury trial in state court
in any case in which he would be entitled to a jury trial in federal court.
At that time the Court was unwilling to express itself as to the future
impact of the Duncan decision on the details of state jury trials, or as
to the applicability to state proceedings of older decisions construing the
sixth amendment:
It seems very unlikely that our decision today will require widespread
changes in state criminal processes. First, our decisions interpreting
the Sixth Amendment are always subject to reconsideration . . . . In
addition, most of the States have provisions for jury trials equal in
breadth to the Sixth Amendment .... I
The Court could have been suggesting that it would not be too
burdensome for the few non-conforming states to put their procedures
process clause. Because the Court held in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), that Duncan
was not to be applied retroactively, the Johnson case was not a suitable vehicle for a full expression
of the constitutional status of the unanimity requirement under the sixth amendment. Robert
Apodaca was tried and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in an Oregon court after Duncan
was decided. The Apodaca case, therefore, squarely presented the question whether the right to
trial by jury in a state court also includes the right to a unanimous verdict.
'Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
5391 U.S. 145 (1968).
1d. at 158.
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in line with the federal standard. Or it may have been suggesting that
the sixth amendment would be re-interpreted not to require all the
common law features.
The latter possibility was realized in Williams v. Florida7 when the
Court stripped away as unnecessary one of the standard features of the
common law jury-the twelve-man panel. Mr. Justice White, again
speaking for the majority, articulated a new test to aid in determining
which features of the common law jury are preserved in the sixth amend-
ment: "The relevant inquiry, as we see it, must be the function which
the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes of a jury
trial."8 Again the Court left open the question of whether the Constitu-
tion required unanimity in state criminal jury verdicts.
In the Apodaca decision the Court finally has faced the issue
squarely and held that jury unanimity is not constitutionally required
for non-capital proceedings in state courts. Although the four Nixon
appointees concurred in the judgment of Justice White's plurality opin-
ion,9 the newcomers did not vote as a cohesive bloc. Justice Powell took
his position between two groups to create shifting majorities.'" He
agreed with Justices White, Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist that un-
animity is not constitutionally required in state proceedings," so that the
petitioners' convictions were affirmed; but he sided with the dissenting
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall in his belief that the
sixth amendment requires a unanimous verdict in federal criminal
trials.' 2 Powell in effect created a bridge between the two groups by
rejecting the doctrine of selective incorporation. 13 This doctrine has
resulted in the ad hoc absorption of the individual guarantees of the Bill
of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, making them applicable to
the states to the same extent they apply to the federal government. 4
7399 U.S. 78 (1970).
sid. at 99.
'This concurrence led the news media to describe the decision as another victory for the
President's "peace forces." N.Y. Times, May 23, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Tim ., June 5, 1972, at
65.
"92 S. Ct. at 1635 (concurring & dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 1641.
"Id. at 1638.
"Id. at 1637, 1640.
"See generally Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 615 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALI. L. REv. 929 (1965);
Henkin, "'Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
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Had Justice White been able to win one additional Justice to his
position, unanimous jury verdicts would not be required in federal crimi-
nal trials either. His plurality decision in Apodaca concluded that unan-
imity-like the twelve-man jury requirement-"was not of constitu-
tional stature."' 15 It is not, therefore, a necessary aspect of the sixth
amendment jury."6 Justice Powell refused to go that far. His reading of
the Court's chain of sixth amendment decisions convinced him that in
enacting the amendment the framers desired to preserve the common
law jury, including the unanimity requirement. 7 Therefore, "the Sixth
Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict in a federal
criminal trial."'18 That requirement is not "so fundamental to the essen-
tials of jury trial," however, as to be binding on the states under the
fourteenth amendment due process clause.19
In holding that conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury does not
violate the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee, Justice White found
the historical evidence inconclusive as to the intent of the framers and
thus turned to other considerations .2 As in his Williams opinion, Justice
White focused upon "the function served by the jury in contemporary
society":
As we said in Duncan, the purpose of trial by jury is to prevent
oppression by the Government by providing a "safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge." "Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser
of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen .... "I'
Unanimity, concluded Justice White, "does not materially contribute to
the exercise of this commonsense judgment. ' 22
Justice White's one-page analysis of the function of the jury and
the unanimity requirement in the modern American legal system seems
very cursory in light of the widespread acceptance of that requirement.
Certainly, the jury has played an important role as a buffer between the
state and individual citizens, particularly in England and the English
1192 S. Ct. at 1630.
'Old.
"Id. at 1638.
,9ld.
"Id. at 1639.
2Id. at 1632.
2Id. at 1632-33 (citations omitted).
2Id.
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colonies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." While that
role is still occasionally applauded today, some observers have sug-
gested that the need for this original virtue of the jury trial has largely
disappeared.2 4 The Court did not even consider an equally important
function of the jury as protector of unpopular minorities from the bias
of the majority.
When members of minority groups-be they racial, religious, or
political-face trial in periods of violent social conflict, the unanimity
requirement is an indispensable check against mob rule. The dissenting
vote of only one or two men can prevent a hasty and unwarranted
conviction. In such a situation, the unpersuaded jurors on a panel may
have been less susceptible to passion and prejudice than the majority;
the true facts may be evident to those few men with cooler heads, while
emotion blinds their fellow jurors. It was to this point that Justice Story
referred when he added the following comment to his discussion of the
jury trial in his famous Commentaries on the Constitution:
The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is, to guard against
a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers, and against a
spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people. Indeed,
it is often more important to guard against the latter than the former
25
Because it requires the concurrence of the unbiased and impartial, the
rule requiring unanimous jury verdicts increases the likelihood that the
guilt or innocence of an accused will be fairly established. As Judge
Brown recently said in condemnation of the Allen charge:26"I think a
"For centuries after the institution of the jury originated toward the end of the thirteenth
century, the right of trial itself was at the King's grace. W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY
200 (1852). The jury was essentially a body of witnesses, selected from the local citizenry because
they had personal knowledge of the case, until the time of Henry VI (1422-61). Id. at 159. Thus
the jury was originated to serve the Crown. The accused was not allowed to introduce witnesses in
his own behalf until 1606. The assistance of counsel was allowed defendants accused of treason
only after the Glorious Revolution (1688), and it was not until 1836 that the same privilege was
extended to those accused of other felonies. F. HELLER, THE SIXT H AiENDMENT TO THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (1951). The jury and other sixth amendment rights, therefore,
began to serve and protect the criminal defendant fairly late in the development of the common
law system.
21E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 188 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2,2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1780 (5th ed.
(1891).2
'The Allen charge is the traditional formula used by many trial judges in an attempt to urge
an apparently deadlocked jury toward unanimity. It was approved by the Supreme Court in Allen
v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
[Vol. 51
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mistrial from a hung jury is a safeguard to liberty. In many areas it is
the sole means by which one or a few may stand out against an over-
whelming contemporary public sentiment. Nothing should interfere
with its exercise." 7 Now that less than unanimous jury verdicts have
been approved for state courts, this protection is virtually eliminated.
If a majority of nine or ten jurors can be formed, the majority need not
even consider the arguments of any dissenters. Debate and deliberation
time will almost certainly be reduced.
As Justice Douglas observed in dissent to Apodaca, the result is a
diminution in the reliability of jury verdicts.28 At the close of Apodaca's
trial, for example, the jury deliberated only forty-one minutes before
bringing in a ten-to-two guilty verdict. It seems unlikely that forty-one
minutes was enough time to "piece together the puzzle of historical
truth'2 9 that was the evidence given these jurors during the trial. One
scholar has explained in the following terms his belief that the unanimity
requirement is essential to the proper performance of the jury's func-
tion:
As writers for years have pointed out, the necessity for unanimity lies
in the fact that it is a blending of the ideal and the real, a compromise
of the abstract and the mundanely true. Unanimity requires full and
frank discussion in the jury room. It requires a defense of each juror's
individual viewpoint and a challenging inquiry to those of opposing
view. . . . Weakness or insecurity of the position of a majority of the
jurors is, in some cases, overcome by the logic and justice of a stronger
position which might have been grasped only by a minority. 0
Kalven and Zeisel, foremost scholars of the American jury, report that
examples of a well-reasoned dissident viewpoint being accepted by the
early majority are not uncommon: "In roughly one case in ten, the
minority eventually succeeds in reversing an initial majority, and these
may be cases of special importance. ' 31 But if non-unanimous verdicts
are allowed and deliberation time is thereby shortened, the initial vote
will almost always become the final verdict.
2Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 955 (1962).
2192 S. Ct. at 1647.
23d.
31Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEo. L.J.
120, 139 (1962).
1 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 490 (1966).
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Justice White rejected the petitioners' claim that a less-than-
unanimous verdict undercuts the standard of reasonable doubt, which
was recently incorporated into the fourteenth amendment due process
guarantee. 32 The fact that two or three jurors vote to acquit does not
impeach the verdict reached by the majority who voted to convict.3
The Court concluded that the "disagreement of three jurors does not
alone establish reasonable doubt, particularly when such a heavy major-
ity of the jury, after having considered the dissenters' views, remains
convinced of guilt. '34
The Court seems to have overlooked the essence of the interrelation
that has developed between reasonable doubt and unanimity: the deci-
sion to grant the defendant in a criminal trial the benefit of the minority
view of reasonable doubt assures the highest possible degree of cer-
tainty. This is not solely a concession to the accused; it is also a con-
scious sacrifice of efficiency to secure widespread public support for the
judicial process. Western society has judged that it is worse for an
innocent man to be found guilty than for a guilty man to go free. This
social judgment may be, as Kalven and Zeisel suggest, "an almost
heroic commitment to decency," 35 but it is a commitment that flows
from an understanding of the terrible consequences of an err6neous
conviction. The Supreme Court, in holding that due process requires the
reasonable-doubt standard in In re Winship, clearly recognized the pub-
lic demand for near certainty:
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable
to command the respect and confidence of the community in applica-
tions of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned."
Unanimity is so ingrained in the common-law procedure that its elimi-
nation would seem to take from the verdict a virtue needed by the
criminal law. The criminal verdict is based on the absence of reasonable
doubt. A dissenting minority of two, three, or more in itself suggests to
the popular mind the existence of a reasonable doubt and impairs public
confidence in the criminal justice system.
"ln re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
192 S. Ct. at 1623-24, 1633.
"Id. at 1625.
11H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 189.
11397 U.S. at 364.
[Vol. 51
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One of the factors that persuaded the Court to drop the twelve-man
jury panel in Williams v. Florida was the lack of evidence suggesting
that the traditional panel was "necessarily more advantageous to the
defendant" than a six-man jury.37 This phrase implies that the Court
will consider whether a given modification of the common law jury will
tip the scales against the accused as it weighs the constitutionality of the
change. Evidence compiled during Kalven and Zeisel's Chicago Jury
Project 3 clearly indicates that the elimination of the unanimity require-
ment is not a neutral step but a significant detriment to the criminal
defendant.
The Chicago study of 3,576 jury trial cases revealed that the jury
brought in roughly two convictions for every acquittal, so that a defen-
dant normally has a thirty percent chance of acquittal. Almost six per-
cent of all juries, or some three thousand trials per year nationwide, end
in a mistrial following jury deadlock .3 The study revealed that roughly
half of the hung jury cases produce the same practical consequences for
a defendant as an acquittal, either because the prosecution drops his
case or because he is acquitted in a subsequent retrial." A, table indicat-
ing the last votes of hung juries under the then-prevailing unanimity
standard reveals that had a non-unanimous verdict of nine-three been
permitted, almost 500 additional defendants, an increase of thirty-three
percent, might have been convicted every year.4" Furthermore, the evi-
11399 U.S. at 101-02.
wrhis pioneering empirical study provided the basic material for Kalven and Zeisel's book,
supra note 31.
11H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 56.
411d. at 57 n.4. Kalven and Zeisel caution that this statistic is based on the estimate of an
"experienced prosecutor" rather than a survey of the outcome of actual cases. Id.
41 d. at 460 n.3:
Last Vote of Deadlocked Juries
Vote for Conviction Per Cent
11:1 ................................................. 24
10:2 ................................................. 10
9:3 ................................................. 10
8:4 ................................................. 6
7:5 ................................................. 13
6:6 ................................................. 13
5:7 ................................................. 8
4:8 ................................................. 4
3:9 ................................................. 4
2:10 ................................................. 8
1:11 ..................................................
100%
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dence does not support the claim made by some supporters of the major-
ity verdict that the accused is just as likely to be acquitted by a majority
verdict as he is to be convicted. As noted above, the normal conviction-
acquittal ratio for all jury trials is two to one, whereas had nine-three
verdicts been accepted, the conviction ratio, in the cases of hung juries
studied, would have been almost four to one. Thus, in instances of
divided juries defendants would have a twenty percent chance of acquit-
tal, compared to a thirty percent chance in trials generally. This in-
creased conviction rate is particularly disturbing because defendants
should have a more favorable chance for acquittal in trials resulting in
a non-unanimous verdict. Presumably these are the closest, most diffi-
cult cases, when neither the prosecution nor the jury majority can con-
vince the dissenting jury members to vote for conviction.
The writer does not mean to imply that these figures provide a
completely accurate forecast of the actual effect of allowing less than
unanimous verdicts in every state. These statistics do indicate, however,
that a shift to non-unanimous verdicts would under no circumstances
aid an accused more than it imperiled him. The converse is equally clear;
the unanimity requirement "is necessarily more advantageous to the
defendant" than a mere majority verdict and thus meets the Williams
test.42
When a man's liberty is in the balance, the reliability of the
decision-making process is very important. Therefore it is significant
that probability theory also underscores the value of the unanimous jury
verdict. Speaking in support of the unanimity requirement over fifty
years ago, James Clark asserted: "It is unquestionably true that the
greater the number of persons entertaining a conclusion the greater the
Number of Juries in Sample-48.
The estimates in the text (and they must be understood as being no more than estimates) were
derived from an analysis of the 3000 cases which end in a divided jury annually. See text accompa-
nying note 39 supra. Under the unanimity standard, 1500 of these defendants may be convicted at
a subsequent retrial. See text accompanying note 40 supra. If a 9-3 verdict is allowed, 1320
defendants (44% times 3000) may be convicted at their first trials. See table supra. Approximately
360 defendants (12% times 3000) may be acquitted. See table supra. The remaining 1320 cases
would still end in a mistrial because the jury was not able to meet the new 9-3 minimum standard
of agreement. An additional 660 of these remaining defendants might be convicted at a subsequent
retrial. See text accompanying note 40 supra. Therefore, from the 3000 cases a total of 1980
defendants may be convicted under a 9-3 standard, an increase of 480 from the results under the
unanimity standard.
42399 U.S. at 101-02.
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probability of that conclusion being sound and true."4 Professor For-
syth has confirmed this axiom mathematically. The probability of a
unanimous verdict being right in a hypothetical case is 167776220:1,
that of a majority of eight to four being right, about 256:1, and that of
a majority of seven to five, about 17:1.11 That these figures are not
without meaning is evident from the Louisiana and Oregon
constitutional provisions requiring a unanimous jury verdict only to
convict a defendant of a capital crime.45 Apparently the people of those
two states want to be as certain as possible of guilt before convicting a
defendant of first degree murder, but do not feel it is necessary to be
quite so certain before convicting him of lesser crimes.
Although the unanimity rule has been a feature of Anglo-American
law for six hundred years, the United States is not the only country to
question its continued application under modern conditions. At present
many foreign legal systems, among them former British territories,
allow majority verdicts." Scottish juries are composed of fifteen mem-
bers and for centuries have been able to bring in a simple majority
verdict of eight to seven. 47 Most striking of all, however, is the abandon-
ment of the unanimity requirement in England. The Criminal Justice
Act of 196711 provides that the verdict of a jury in criminal cases need
not be unanimous if in a case where there are twelve or eleven jurors,
ten agree on the verdict, or in a case where there are only ten jurors,
nine agree. The court may not accept a majority verdict of guilty unless
the jury has deliberated for at least two hours.
As far-reaching as the unanimity decision is, the Court has left
open a number of important questions. Probably foremost among these
unresolved issues is the acceptable minimum jury vote. The Court ap-
proved a nine-three verdict, and Justice White emphasized the fact that
a "heavy majority" had voted for conviction.49 Concurring, Justice
Blackmun implied that he would draw the line at eight-four; anything
below that would be unacceptable."0 But in dissent, Justice Stewart
suggested that nothing in the majority's reasoning would prevent states
43Clark, Should Verdicts Be Unanimous in Criminal Cases?, 46 A.B.A. REP. 591, 593 (1921).
11W. FORSYTH, supra note 23, at 210-11 n.1.
'ILA. CONST. art. 7, § 41; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 11.
4
"Samuels, Criminal Justice Act, 31 MODERN L. REV. 16, 25 (1968).
97 J. McDONALD, CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 559 (4th ed. 1929).
"
8Crimrinal Justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 13.
4192 S. Ct. at 1625.
"Id. at 1635.
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allowing simple majority (seven-five) verdicts." There is no clue in the
majority decision as to whether juries of less than twelve (allowed under
Williams) must be unanimous. Nor is it clear whether unanimity will
be required in capital cases; all of the defendants whose convictions were
affirmed in Apodaca and the companion cases faced non-capital sent-
ences. Finally, how will the Court justify invalidating convictions
brought in by votes of "three to two, or even two to one," as Justice
Douglas put it?52
The full impact of the decisions will not be evident until the states
respond to the new opportunities opened to them. It should be empha-
sized that the old rule of unanimity still stands in the federal courts.
Although they handle only a tiny fraction of all criminal trials, the
federal courts are the fora for some of the nation's most dramatic and
difficult cases-particularly the federal conspiracy charges,"3 so popu-
lar of late with the Justice Department. Most criminal trials take place
in the state courts,54 and it is there that changes will be felt. Most
observers believe that many states will alter their criminal procedures
to take advantage of the less than unanimous jury verdict.5 As indicated
above, a slightly higher conviction rate may be expected.56 Concomi-
tantly, state prosecutors may enjoy whatever benefits accrue from" a few
more guilty pleas and a greater willingness to plea-bargain on the part
of criminal defendants. Despite the anguished cries of the dissenters that
the majority has "cut the heart out of" the jury trial,57 the decision can
affect at most only five or six percent of all criminal trials. Over ninety-
four percent result in clearcut conviction or acquittal-without jury
disagreement-under the old unanimity rule.5" Furthermore, only a tiny
fraction of all criminal defendants ask for trial-no more than fifteen
"1d. at 1627.
5292 S. Ct. at 1649.
'18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
f"See Friendly, supra note 14, at 936 n.40, pointing out that in 1963 the Supreme Court and
County Courts of New York handled the cases of 19,888 criminal defendants, and the state's lowest
courts handled an additional 452,271 felonies and misdemeanors. During approximately the same
period, the federal district courts in New York disposed of 1,8 16 criminal cases.
OSee sources cited note 9 supra.
"5See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
5792 S. Ct. at 1651 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 453. Of this 6% of deadlocked juries, just over
half contain one, two, or three dissenting jurors. If the Court does draw the line at 9-3 verdicts
(see text accompanying notes 49-51 supra), the unanimity decisions will affect some 3% of all
criminal trials annually.
[Vol. 51
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percent." Unlike the rulings on the right to counsel," search and sei-
zure,"' or coerced confession, 2 for example, which affected most crimi-
nal defendants, the Apodaca decision will directly touch only one of
every one or two hundred defendants. Its psychic impact on the Ameri-
can system of justice may be more difficult to measure.
THOMAS A. LEMLY
Environmental Law-Substantive Judicial Review Under The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)' sets
forth a declaration of national environmental policy (section 101)2 and
establishes procedural requirements for governmental agencies when-
ever a major Federal activity which will have a major impact on the
environment is undertaken (section 102). 3 These procedural require-
ments include the compilation of information and submission of an
environmental impact statement to the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity before any work on a major federal project is begun. Section 102
"Id. at 17-18.
c°Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
81Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
'42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
242 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970):
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the inter-
relations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influ-
ences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the
critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall
welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal
Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned
public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including
financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;
